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Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
Overcoming the Defense of Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity in Cases 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, there have been several U.S. court cases involving 
issues of human rights and international law.! These may be more than merely 
a steady trickle of anomalous cases. Rather, these cases could set a trend pre-
saging a flood of similar litigation which may transform U.S. federal courts into 
forums for litigating international human rights violations.2 
Three factors have contributed to the paucity of international human rights 
litigation in U.S. courts. First, international law traditionally has been "statist," 
recognizing rights in nations, not individuals.3 Second, human rights plaintiffs 
are often unable to assert a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction when 
the defendant is a foreign government or its agent.· Third, even when subject 
matter jurisdiction exists, many cases are precluded from judicial consideration 
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).5 
I In the past two years, such cases have included Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); Sanchez.Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Frolova 
v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 
82-1772 RMT (MCx) slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,1985). 
2 See, e.g., Leland, U.S. Court of Human Rights?, CAL. LAw. Jan. 10, 1985, at 10, 12 (1985); D'Amato, 
What does Tel-Oren tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 92, 93-94 (1985). 
3 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, j., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); C. NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INT'L LAW 
11 (1962); D'Amato, supra note 2, at 103-04; D'Zurilla, Individual Responsibility for Torture Under 
International Law, 56 TuL. L. REV. 186, 187-88 (1981). 
• Since 1980, nearly all defendants in Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) actions have been aliens. See, 
e.g., Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (Soviet Union 
defendant); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir., 1985) (Soviet Union 
defendant); Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772 RMT (MCx) slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) 
(Argentina and an Argentinian province defendants); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Libya and the PLO defendants); Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Paraguayan police official defendant). 
5 Normally, state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, would have subject matter jurisdiction over 
any claim brought before them. In cases involving foreign sovereigns, however, state courts are subject 
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-
1611 (1976), and its provisions regarding personal jurisdiction over a foreign state. See H.R. REp. No. 
94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6610 
[hereinafter House Report]. As the House Report specifically states: "the [Foreign Sovereign Immun-
ities Act] ... sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign 
immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United States." Id. at 6610. 
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Recent events, however, have reduced the applicability of the first two factors. 
Due primarily to the United Nations' efforts, the influence of the statist view-
point has diminished with the increased recognition of individual rights under 
international law.6 Furthermore, as to subject matter jurisdiction, the court in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,7 held that jurisdiction did exist under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (ATCA)8 in a suit between aliens involving a tort in violation of the 
international law of human rights. 9 
The last factor, foreign sovereign immunity, still presents an obstacle to 
human rights litigants. IO The FSIA confers a broad general grant of immunity 
upon foreign states subject to enumerated exceptions. II The majority of the 
FSIA's exceptions are designed to accommodate plaintiffs in commercial 
litigation [2 or disputes regarding property. [3 The single "non-commercial tort" 
exception concerns acts committed in U.S. territory only. [4 These exceptions, 
therefore, have been of little assistance to human rights plaintiffs seeking to 
establish jurisdiction in U.S. courts. [5 
6 See Note, Limiting the Scope of Federal jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 941, 
944 (1984). This development is evidenced by such documents and agreements as, for example, the 
United Nations Charter, articles 55 and 56, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRU-
MENTS (R. Lillich ed. 1985). 
7 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
828 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). 
9630 F.2d at 887. 
10 The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity has absolute and restrictive manifestations. Under 
the absolute theory, a state may not be sued in foreign courts, regardless of the dispute's nature. 
Under the restrictive theory, a distinction is drawn between acts jure gestionis (private acts), for which 
a sovereign may be sued, and acts jure imperii (public or sovereign acts), for which the state is immune. 
See generally G. BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL & PROGNOSTIC VIEW 21-40 (1984); I. BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 318-32 (2d ed. 1973); Note, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act of 1976: jurisdictional Considerations Under Recent Cases, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 59,60-
62 (1982) [hereinafter jurisdictional Considerations]. 
11 jurisdictional Considerations, supra note 10, at 68-9. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 grants immunity to foreign 
sovereigns subject to existing international agreements to which the United States was party on October 
21, 1976, when the FSIA was enacted. (This "subject to" exception is discussed in detail infra, text 
accompanying notes 182-236.) 
28 U.S.C. § 1605 sets forth exceptions to this general grant of immunity. Section 1605(b) covers 
exceptions to immunity applicable in admiralty cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b). Section 1605(a) covers a 
variety of other exceptions, which are detailed infra at notes 56-60. 
12 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). For a discussion of commercial cases under the Act, see jurisdictional 
Considerations, supra note 10. See also generally Annotation, Exceptions to jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign 
States and their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,59 A.L.R. Fed. 99 (1982). 
13 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3), (4). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
[5 See, e.g., Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1985) Ourisdiction under 
noncommercial tort exception denied wh~re tortious act alleged did not occur on U.S. territory). 
In Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 
(1984), § 1605(a)(5) jurisdiction was denied on grounds similar to Persinger; § 1605(a)(2)'s commercial 
exception was denied because the alleged tort of wrongful death by assassination was insufficiently 
connected to defendant's commercial activity, id. at 332; and a treaty provision establishing a limited 
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The FSIA also restricts the availability of judicial remedies for human rights 
plaintiffs by limiting the scope of other jurisdictional statutes. For example, the 
A TCA establishes subject matter jurisdiction for claims by aliens alleging torts 
"committed in violation of the Law of Nations or a treaty of the United States."16 
Where the defendant is a foreign sovereign or its agent, however, the FSIA 
would appear to bar suit regardless of the ATCA unless an exception to im-
munity applies. 17 Thus, the FSIA has limited the ATCA's utility to cases involv-
ing private persons as defendants. IS 
One recent decision, Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,19 suggests 
several possible means by which international human rights plaintiffs may over-
come the problem of foreign sovereign immunity. The Von Dardel case is par-
ticularly interesting in that other recent decisions on similar issues have upheld 
defenses of sovereign immunity.20 It is therefore uncertain exactly what the 
present U.S. law of sovereign immunity is. This Comment will first examine the 
development of the U.S. law of sovereign immunity, with particular emphasis 
upon the FSIA. The Comment then reviews recent litigation under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, including a discussion of the Von Dardel case in some depth. 
The next section of the Comment examines the arguments against sovereign 
immunity which prevailed in Von Dardel in light of the legislative and judicial 
history of the FSIA. The author concludes by considering whether the Von 
Dardel case presents a workable model for applying the FSIA in future human 
rights cases. 
II. THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 
Although commercial litigants have regularly invoked several of the enum-
erated exceptions to the FSIA,21 these provisions have not proven useful in 
waiver of sovereign immunity was found inapplicable under § 1605(a)(I), id. at 333. See infra notes 
266-80 and accompanying text. 
16 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
17 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5 (1983). "[I]f none of the 
exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the [FSIA] applies, the District Court lacks ... personal 
jurisdiction." [d. See also infra note 18. 
18 Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (ATCA action allowable against private 
citizen) with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) id. at 805 n.13 (Bork, J., concurring) (ATCA action against Libya barred by sovereign 
immunity). 
19 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985). 
20 See, e.g., Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1773 RMT (MCx) slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985), 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 107-19; Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 
F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) discussed infra text accompanying notes 151-60, 199-208. 
21 See, e.g., Proyedin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (provision of loan agreement waives sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(I»; 
Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984) (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)'s 
"commercial activity" exception to immunity establishes jurisdiction over Federal securities action 
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establishing jurisdiction over human rights claims. 22 Congress enacted the FSIA 
primarily in response to the increase in commercial activity by states.23 Although 
the non-commercial tort exception potentially is applicable to cases involving 
human rights violations, the exception requires that the tortious act occur in 
th(: United States.24 This territorial requirement bars many human rights plain-
tiffs from bringing suit under § 1605(a)(5).25 Because human rights plaintiffs 
could not obtain subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, U.S. courts adju-
dicated few international human rights cases until 1980, when the Filartiga court 
held that the Alien Tort Claims Act26 provided an independent basis for subject 
matter jurisdiction. 27 
A. The Role of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Law 
Sovereign immunity is a principle of "grace and comity"28 between na-
tions under which one nation is immune from suit in the courts of an-
arising out of Mexican bank's sale of certificate of deposit to U.S. investor); Velidor v. UP/G Benghazi, 
653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 929 (1982) (Yugoslavian seaman's breach of contract 
action against Algerian government for wages owed under the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 596-
97 falls under "commercial activity" exception). For an overview of commercial cases under the FSIA, 
see Annotation, supra note 12. See also infra notes 56, 57. 
22 See, e.g., Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772 RMT (MCx) slip op. (G.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) 
(FSIA exceptions inapplicable to ATCA claim alleging "official torture" in violation of international 
law); Frolova V. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (sovereign immunity 
bars suit alleging violations of U.N. Charter and Helsinki Accords). The Siderman case is discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 107-19. Fr%va is discussed infra text accompanying notes 151-60, 199-
208. 
23 House Report, supra note 5, at 6605: "In a modern world where foreign state enterprises are 
every day participants in commercial activities [the FSIA) is urgently needed legislation." [d. 
24 The noncommercial tort exception provides that 
[a) foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or 
of the States in any case -
(5) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the 
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign 
state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall 
not apply to -
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or 
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misre-
presentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
25 Courts have strictly construed § 1605(a)(5)'s requirement that a tortious act be committed on U.S. 
territory. The plaintiffs in both McKeel V. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983) and 
Persinger V. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984) sought damages for injuries 
suffered during the occupation by terrorists of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran in 1979-1980. The 
courts in both cases denied jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(5), finding that the embassy and its grounds 
were not U.S. territory within the meaning of the FSIA. 
Compare Letelier V. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D. D.C. 1980) (§ 1605(a)(5) applies 
where tortious act, an assassination, occurred on U.S. soil). 
26 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
27 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
28 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,486 (1983). 
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other.29 Sovereign immunity was first expressed in U.S. law in The Schooner 
Exchange v. M'Faddon,30 where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity barred the arrest of a French warship in a U.S. harbor. 31 
The Schooner Exchange ruling rested upon a theory of absolute immunity, 
under which a foreign sovereign may not be sued in U.S. courts for any reason.32 
Although some subsequent Supreme Court rulings implied that sovereign im-
munity might be less than absolute under certain circumstances,33 the Court 
continued to apply absolute immunity through the early part of the twentieth 
century.34 Indeed, while Congress and the State Department have moved away 
from absolute immunity, the Court has never explicitly rejected the principle.35 
A pronounced movement away from absolute immunity nevertheless began 
within the international community in the early part of this century.36 This shift 
was triggered largely by an increase in state involvement in commercial activities, 
especially among socialist nations.37 This led to the development of a restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity.38 Under the restrictive theory, a sovereign may 
be sued in foreign courts for its private acts but retains immunity for its public 
acts.39 
The 1945 Supreme Court decision, Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,40 reflected 
the growing influence of the restrictive theory of immunity. In Hoffman, the 
29 [d. 
'011 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
'I [d. at 147. 
'2 [d. at 137. See generally Note, The Supreme Court's Verlinden Decision: A Retreat to Activism, 16 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1081, 1097-98 (1983) [hereinafter Retreat To Activism); jurisdictional Considerations, 
supra note 10, at 60. 
33 See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). 
That case arose out of a dispute involving a corporation partly owned by the state of Georgia. In 
dictum, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[i)t is ... a sound principle, that when a government 
becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests [sic) itself, so far as concerns the transactions of 
that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." [d. at 907. See also The 
Santissima Trinidad & the Saint Ander, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822) (sovereign immunity does not 
bar in rem jurisdiCtion over pirated goods). 
'4 See, e.g., Berrizi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (absolute theory of immunity 
applied in dispute involving a commercial vessel wholly owned by a foreign government.) See also Ex 
Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (Peruvian-owned vessel held immune from suit in contract dispute). 
35 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725 (1976) (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
'6 See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 319-20. 
37 G. VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INT'L LAW 142 (4th ed. 1981). 
Von Glahn asserts that "the process of restricting state immunity was hastened, in part because the 
Soviet Union had adopted state-conducted monopolies in foreign trade and shipping." [d. This phe-
nomenon originated during the nineteenth century, when many nations established State-sanctioned 
monopolies in particular trades, and also began operating railway, shipping, and postal services. 
BROWNLIE, supra note 36, at 319-20. Brownlie states, however, that the First World War hastened 
State involvement in commercial activities. /d. at 320. See also Retreat To Activism, supra note 32, at 1098. 
'8 Retreat to Activism, supra note 32, at 1098. 
'9 House Report, supra note 5, at 6605. 
40 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
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Court permitted jurisdiction over a commercial vessel owned by MexicoY The 
Hoffman court, however, did not expressly base its decision on restrictive im-
munity.42 Rather, the Court concluded that because the Executive branch had 
not recommended immunity, national policy now permitted the court not to 
extend immunity in certain cases.43 
In 1952, the State Department endorsed the adoption of the restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity in the famous "Tate letter."44 The Tate letter approach 
allowed the foreign sovereign to petition the State Department for a determi-
nation of immunity, with the State Department then recommending to the 
judiciary whether immunity was appropriate.45 Generally, these recommenda-
tions were respected by the courts.46 Where the State Department declined to 
make a recommendation, the courts determined whether immunity was appro-
priate.47 
This bifurcated system for determining immunity created several problems. 
First, the State Department placed itself "in the awkward position of a political 
institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the 
courtS."48 Additionally, this system allowed the foreign state discretion as to 
whether to petition the State Department for immunity or leave the matter to 
the courts, an arrangement which further politicized the process.49 This resulted 
in considerable uncertainty for plaintiffs, who could not be sure what standards 
would be applied to resolve a defense of sovereign immunity. 50 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act51 remedied these problems by setting 
forth a single standard for deciding questions of sovereign immunity in U.S. 
courtS.52 Intending to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, Con-
gress modeled the Act after a long-arm statute.53 The FSIA therefore provides 
41Id. at 38. 
42Id. 
43/d. 
4426 DEPT. ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952) (Letter from Acting Legal Advisor to Secretary of State, Jack 
B. Tate, to Acting Attorney General Phillip B. Periman, May 19, 1952). 
45 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983). 
46/d. 
47Id. See also jurisdictional Considerations, supra note 10, at 63; Retreat to Activism, supra note 32, at 
1099-1100. 
48 House Report, supra note 5, at 6607. 
49Id. 
SOld. 
51 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, I 332(a)(2-4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976). 
52 House Report, supra note 5, at 6610. 
53 House Report, supra note 5, at 6612, 6626. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, many plaintiffs 
had attached a foreign nation's property in the United States in order to obtain quasi in remjurisdiction 
over the sovereign defendant. jurisdictional Considerations, supra note 10, at 67. Such jurisdictional 
attachments often involved U.S. courts in dispute, having little relationship to the United States aside 
from the presence of the property within the jurisdiction. House Report, supra note 5, at 6625. 
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both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving foreign sover-
eigns and their agencies or instrumentalities. 54 
The FSIA confers immunity upon the foreign sovereign subject to enumer-
ated exceptions.55 Under the FSIA, the foreign sovereign is subject to suit: (1) 
if it has expressly or impliedly waived immunity;56 (2) if its actions are connected 
with a commercial activity having some relation to the United States;57 (3) if its 
Congress therefore enacted the FSIA, intending it "to provide a long-arm statute that makes attach-
ment for jurisdictional purposes unnecessary in cases where there is a nexus between the claim and 
the United States." [d. at 6626. Specifically, Congress patterned the Act after the District of Columbia 
long-arm statute. [d. at 6612. See also jurisdictional Considerations, supra note 10, at 59. 
54 House Report, supra note 5, at 6611. Personal jurisdiction is established by 28 U.S.c. § 1330(b) 
for any claim falling under one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 
and 1607. When an exception exists, subject matter jurisdiction is provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). 
FSIA § 1603(a) defines a "foreign state" so as to include "a political subdivision of a foreign or an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." 
Section 1603(b) of the Act provides that 
[a]n "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity -
(I) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of the foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of 
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) 
and (d) of this title [28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), (d)] nor created under the laws of any third country. 
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 
55 House Report, supra note 5, at 6616. These exceptions are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 
and 1607. This rule of general immunity subject to limited exceptions is in contrast to the position 
adopted prior to the enactment of the FSIA in Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). Under the Victory Transport rule courts would deny 
immunity to a foreign sovereign's acts unless they fell into one of five categories: (I) internal admin-
istrative acts; (2) legislative acts; (3) military acts; (4) acts of diplomacy; or (5) public loans. [d. at 360. 
56 28 U.S.c. § 1605(a)(I) (1976). Cases construing this provision of the FSIA include Proyecfin de 
Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1985) (explicit contractual 
waiver of immunity sufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(l) of the FSIA); Resource 
Dynamics Int'l, Ltd. v. General Peoples Comm. for Communications and Maritime Transport in the 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 593 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (agreement that contract 
be interpreted according to Virginia state law constituted waiver of immunity by defendant nation); 
Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 
1980) (sovereign'S agreement that arbitration take place where the parties or the arbitrators might 
agree establishes consent to suit in the United States). But see Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment 
v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (agreement to 
arbitrate disagreements through the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
does not constitute waiver of immunity from suit in U.S. courts); Friedar v. Government of Israel, 
614 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sovereign's alleged promise to pay plaintiff's medical expenses is 
not an implied waiver of immunity). 
For a detailed discussion of some cases interpreting § 1605(a)(I), see infra notes 151-60, 162-75 
and accompanying text. See also Annotation, supra note 12, at 108-114 (1982). 
57 28 U .S.C. § 1605(a)(2). This section of the FSIA provides an exception to immunity in any case 
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United 
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actions involve rights in property taken in violation of internationallaw;58 (4) if 
its actions involve immovable property in the United States or rights in property 
acquired by succession or gift;59 and (5) ifits actions comprise a non-commercial 
tort where the tortious act occurred in the United States.60 Although immunity 
is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff may not obtain a default judgment without 
demonstrating that one of these exceptions applies. 61 
B. Recent Human Rights Case Law Under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
1. Development of Individual Rights Under International Law 
The evolution of international law with regard to individual rights has come 
nearly full circle since the late eighteenth century.62 When the Judiciary Act of 
178963 established the federal courts in the United States, international law was 
largely derived from the Roman conception of jus gentium.64 Under this ap-
proach, international law governed not only the relations between states, but 
also disputes between states and individuals.65 
The "statist" model of international law became predominant with the up-
surge of positivism in the nineteenth century.66 Under the positivist view, states 
alone, and not individuals, are subjects of international law. This theory, while 
well suited for disputes between nations, obliged jurists to adopt awkward and 
unconvincing rationales for international disputes concerning individuals.67 In 
such cases, traditional international law employed a legal fiction wherein osten-
sible injury to the individual claimant's state was alleged.68 Only in this fashion 
could an injured person receive redress in an international forum. 69 
This conception of the international legal order prevailed throughout the 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the V nited States. 
28 V.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). 
For an extensive overview of cases interpreting § 1605(a)(2), see Annotation, supra note 12, at 114-
33. 
58 28 V.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). 
59 28 V.S.C. § 1605(a)(4). 
60 28 V.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
61 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20 (1983). 
62 I)'Amato, supra note 2, at 104. 
63 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
64 I)' Amato, supra note 2, at 103. 
65/d. at 104. See also Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 HODS. J. INT'L 
L. 81, 86-90 (1981). 
66 I)'Amato, supra note 2, at 102-05. 
67 Id. at 102. 
6sId. 
69 Id. at 102-05. 
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early part of the twentieth century.70 The modern trend, however, harks back 
to the pre-positivist recognition that individual rights exist at internatidnallaw.71 
This shift in opinion was prompted largely by the lessons of World War II and 
the Nuremberg trials. 72 Various declarations and agreements promulgated by 
the newly established United Nations in the early post-war period further 
evidenced recognition of individual human rights under international law. 73 
Established principles of customary international law are always incorporated 
into the law of the United States.74 Such rules of international law are not static, 
but develop over time, and U.S. courts are obliged to recognize such principles 
as have received "the general assent of civilized nations."75 It has therefore been 
argued that, since individuals have rights under internationallaw,76 and because 
U.S. law incorporates this law, established principles of international human 
rights law may be invoked in U.S. courts.77 
2. The A.lien Tort Claims Act as a Basis for Subject Matter jurisdiction 
Claims alleging violations of international human rights were not numerous 
in U.S. courts prior to 1980.78 This was in part because most claims arising 
70Id. at 104; see generally D'Zurilla, supra note 3, at 187-89. 
7I D'Amato, supra note 2, at 104; D'Zurilla, supra note 3, at 189. But see BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 
572. Brownlie, when addressing the issue of individual rights at international law, has stated: "Cus-
tomary international law still maintains the rule that it is the state which has the capacity to present 
international claims, even though in many cases the claim is substantially that of a private person." Id. 
72 D'Zurilla, supra note 3, at 189. 
73 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, Art. 55 & 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217A (III) (1948), reprinted in INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (R. Lillich ed. 1985). 
74 See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. 
PA. L. REV. 26 (1952). Under Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, treaties are the 
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has held that "where there 
is no treaty ... resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and commentators." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
75 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694. 
76 In the field of human rights, these include at least the right to be free from slavery, official 
torture, summary execution, and genocide. See J. Blum & R. Steinhardt, Federal jurisdiction Over Human 
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 90-92 (1981). 
77 See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), afi'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), in which the District Court held 
an excludable Cuban refugee'S detention in maximum security prison pending deportation to be a 
violation of international law. 505 F. Supp. at 798. Although the Appeals Court's affirmance rested 
on constitutional grounds, that court in its decision noted that "[ilt seems proper ... to consider 
international law principles for notions of fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention" and 
found that "[nlo principle of international law is more fundamental than the concept that human 
beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment." 654 F.2d at 1388. 
78 Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law Into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. 
INT'L L. 1,2-5 (1981). 
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under international human rights law involved two alien parties.79 Plaintiffs, 
therefore, were hard pressed to assert a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in 
the federal courts.80 Even when federal subject matter jurisdiction was otherwise 
established, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act could bar a human rights 
claim by eliminating the court's personal jurisdiction over the parties. 81 
The Alien Tort Claims Act, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the Law of Nations or a treaty of the United States,"82 may 
become the primary vehicle for asserting jurisdiction in future human rights 
cases. A major breakthrough for foreign nationals seeking to litigate interna-
tional human rights claims in U.S. courts occurred in the 1980 decision of 
Filartiga v. Pena-lrala. 83 Dr. Joel Filartiga alleged that his seventeen-year-old son 
Joelito was kidnapped and tortured to death by the defendant Pena-Irala, a 
Paraguayan police official. 84 Dr. Filartiga and his daughter Dolly brought a 
wrongful death action in U.S. District Court, asserting that jurisdiction existed 
under the ATCA,85 then regarded as an obscure section of the U.S. Judicial 
Code. 86 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the statute 
79 One commentator has stated that "[i]t is undeniable that the grossest violations of human rights 
take place by governments against their own nationals. There are very few cases in which this is not 
the case." Hassan, Panacea or Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights Law: Recent 
Cases, 4 Hous.J. INT'L L. 13, 19 (1981). 
See, e.g., Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (Soviet 
Union defendant); Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772 RMT (MCx) slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 
1985) (Argentina defendant). 
80 Such cases could presumably have been brought in state courts, but the likelihood of removal to 
federal court would be great. In addition, one jurist suggests that state court determination of inter-
national law questions may pose serious problems of separation of powers and federalism. See Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 804-05 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Moreover, although suit could be brought under the FSIA after its 
enactment in 1976, this is unlikely for reasons discussed supra at notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772 RMT (MCx) slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985) 
(FSIA bars action alleging torture in violation of international law despite existence of ATCA juris-
diction) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 107-19); cf. Tel-Oren 726 F.2d 774, 775-76 n.1 
(Edwards, J., concurring) (had ATCA jurisdiction existed, sovereign immunity would have barred suit 
against state defendant); id. at 805 n.13 (Bork J., concurring) (same). 
82 28 U.S.c. § 1350 (1982). 
83 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
84Id. at 878. Dr. Filartiga and his daughter Dolly Filartiga, claiming that Joelito was tortured to 
death in retaliation for his father's antigovernment activities, brought an apparently fruitless criminal 
action against Pena-Irala in the Paraguayan courts. Id. Meanwhile, in 1978 Pena-Irala arrived in the 
United States under a visitor's visa and remained illegally. Id. Dolly Filartiga, then living in Washington, 
D.C., learned of Pena-Irala's illegal presence in the United States and notified the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). /d. at 879. While Pena-Irala was in the custody of the INS, Dolly Filartiga 
served him with a summons and filed an action in the District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York. /d. 
85Id. 
86 One respected federal appeals court judge had characterized the ATCA as a "legal Lohengrin," 
because "no one seems to know whence it came." lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 
1987] FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 353 
allowed suits by alien plaintiffs alleging violations of generally recognized in-
ternational human rights norms.87 
The Filartigas maintained that their cause of action arose under various 
international declarations,88 and the proscription of "official torture" under 
customary internationallaw.89 Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed in his decision that a proscription against official torture "ha[d] 
become part of customary internationallaw,"90 and concluded that international 
law's prohibition of official torture allowed no distinction between a nation's 
treatment of aliens and its own citizens.9 ! Because Pena-Irala had committed a 
tort in violation of the norms of international human rights law, Judge Kaufman 
reasoned that jurisdiction existed under the ATCA.92 
The next U.S. court interpretation of the ATCA in a human rights context 
was Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.93 In Tel-Oren, the plaintiffs, survivors of a 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) raid, brought suit against the PLO, 
Libya, and several Arab-American organizations.94 The complaint alleged mul-
tiple tortious acts in violation of the law of nations and various treaties of the 
United States, and cited the ATCA as a basis for jurisdiction.95 
1975) (Friendly, J .). See also Comment, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal jurisdiction Uruler the Alien Tort Claims 
Act of 1789. 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 105 (1979). 
87 630 F.2d at 887. 
88 Id. at 879. See infra note 90. 
89/d. The Filartiga plaintiffs cited the opinions of commentators as supporting this view of customary 
international law. Id. at 879 n.4. 
90 Id. at 882. Among the documents relied upon by the Filartiga court in finding official torture a 
violation of international law were the United Nations Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Dec. 10, 1948 G.A. Res. 217(A) (Ill) U.N. Doc. A/81O, at 71; The Declaration on the Protection 
of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 9, 1975, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. 
AlI034 [hereinafter Declaration on Protection from Torture]; American Convention on Human 
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at I, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAlSer.UVlll.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 
(English ed. 1979). All of the above-cited documents can be found in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS (R. Lillich ed. 1985). 
91 630 F.2d 876, 884. 
92Id. at 887. 
93 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). For further discussion of Tel-
Oren, see, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 2, at I; Cole, Challenging Covert War: The Politics of the Political 
Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 155, 173-75 (1985); Comment, After Tel-Oren: Should Federal 
Courts Infer a Cause of Action Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 281 (1985); Case 
Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 
211 (1985); Note, Limiting the Scope of Federal jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 
941 (1984). 
94 726 F.2d at 775. The three Arab-American organizations named as defendants in Tel-Oren were 
the Palestine Information Office, the National Association of Arab-Americans, and the Palestine 
Congress of North America. These defendants, along with Libya, were alleged to have supported the 
PLO in its illegal activities. Id. 
95Id. 
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Both the District Court96 and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals97 denied 
jurisdiction under the ATCA and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.9s In addition 
to issuing a brief per curiam opinion,99 each of the three Circuit judges in Tel-
Oren wrote a lengthy concurrence explaining his reasoning. Judge Robb con-
cluded that the political question doctrine barred consideration of the case.IOO 
Judge Bork reasoned that the ATCA merely established jurisdiction in federal 
courts for tort claims involving international law, but did not create an inde-
pendent right to sue. 101 Judge Edwards approved of the Filartiga holding, but 
found that the state action necessary to establish a violation of international law 
was not present in Tel-Oren. 102 
Although the issue of sovereign immunity was not addressed, Tel-Oren is 
nonetheless illustrative of a problem likely to plague potential plaintiffs under 
the ATCA. As in Filartiga, the alleged tort was "official torture," an established 
violation of international human rights standards. 103 The international agree-
96 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 
(1985). 
97 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
98 The District Court's dismissal can be found at 517 F. Supp. at 551. The Court of Appeals' 
affirmance of the dismissal is at 726 F.2d at 775. 
99 726 F.2d at 775. 
100Id. at 823. The political question doctrine provides that certain issues are not susceptible of 
judicial resolution, either because (I) their resolution has been constitutionally committed to another 
branch; (2) a decision would require the employment of standards defying judicial application or 
involving the judiciary in unwarranted policy making; or (3) although not precluded by either of the 
two preceding considerations, a decision on the merits would embarrass or indicate a lack of respect 
for a coordinate branch, or would overturn a political decision already made, to which unquestioned 
adherence is required. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). Finding that all three criteria were 
present, Judge Robb dismissed the Tel-Oren plaintiffs' claims. 726 F.2d at 827. 
101 726 F.2d at 801. Judge Bork acknowledged that, if a cause of action were not explicitly granted 
by international law or an applicable U.S. treaty, a right to sue might be inferred from the statute 
itself. /d. He concluded, however, that because "adjudication of [the plaintiffs'] claim would present 
grave separation of powers problems," id. at 805, the Tel-Oren case was "not ... appropriate for federal 
court adjudication ... without an express grant of a cause of action." Id. at 808. 
Judge Bork then considered whether the "law of nations" or treaties of the United States cited by 
plaintiffs independently established a cause of action which would allow them an entrance into U.S. 
courts under the ATCA. Id. at 808-19. His inquiry was circumscribed by his conception of the ATCA, 
which he considered to establish jurisdiction only when international law or a U.S. treaty expressly 
provided a right to sue. Id. at 820. Because he found that no such right existed, Judge Bork dismissed 
the plaintiffs' claims. For a student Comment supporting Judge Bork's analysis of cause of action 
under the ATCA, see Note, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 353 (1981). 
102 726 F.2d at 795. Although admitting that two of the offenses alleged by the Tel-Oren plaintiffs, 
torture and summary execution, violated international law, Judge Edwards nevertheless maintained 
that international law prohibited such acts only if committed by states or persons acting under color 
of state law. Id. at 794-95. Judge Edwards therefore concluded that the Tel-Oren plaintiffs' claims must 
fail because the defendant PLO was neither a recognized state nor acting under color of state law. /d. 
at 791. 
1113/d. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring), citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
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ments and custom establishing the illegality of such torture indicate, however, 
that only state-sponsored torture violates international law. 1M This state-spon-
sorship requirement, common to many human rights violations,105 forces any 
plaintiff attempting to invoke ATCA jurisdiction to name either a foreign 
sovereign or its agent as a defendant, thereby inviting assertion of the foreign 
sovereign immunity defense. 106 
The 1985 case of Siderman v. Argentina l07 was the first ATCA case squarely 
confronting the issue of foreign sovereign immunity. The facts of that case are 
similar to Filartiga. In March, 1976, on the night of a military coup in Argentina, 
members of the armed forces abducted Jose Siderman from his home. lOB Sid-
erman was held captive for a week, tortured, and repeatedly threatened with 
death if he and his family did not leave Argentina. 109 Upon his release, the 
Sidermans fled to the United States, where they have remained since. IIO 
The Sidermans filed an action against Argentinalll in U.S. District Court, 
alleging jurisdiction under the A TCA.ll2 The District Court issued an order 
finding subject matter jurisdiction over the torture claim under the ATCA and 
asserting personal jurisdiction over Argentina. ll3 Subsequently, the court en-
104 See, e.g., Declaration on Protection from Torture, supra note 90. The Declaration defines torture 
as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by 
or at the instigation of a public official on a person." [d. at art. I (emphasis added). 
105 One analysis of this issue notes that, although "the instruments prohibiting [slavery and genocide] 
expressly extend liability to private persons as well as government officials[,] [t]orture and summary 
execution appear to violate international law only when committed by or at the behest of government 
officials." Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 95-96. 
106 This problem was alluded to by two of the three Tel-Oren judges in their concurrences. Judge 
Edwards found that the PLO, as a non-state actor, could not have committed official torture, 726 F.2d 
at 791. Yet, he recognized that Libya, the one sovereign among the defendants, was insulated from 
suit by virtue of sovereign immunity, regardless of jurisdiction under the ATCA. [d. at 776 n.1. Judge 
Bork held that the ATCA, while conferring a right of entry into the federal courts, did not create a 
cause of action. According to Judge Bork, unless some independent basis of a right to sue could be 
adduced, the ATCA dJd not establish jurisdiction. Judge Bork did agree, however, that suit against 
Libya was barred by the FSIA. [d. at 805 n.13. Judge Bork went on to suggest that a Fi/artiga-based 
interpretation of the ATCA would require courts to resolve "whether the relationship between the 
PLO and Libya constituted that of agent and principal." [d. at 821. 
107 No. CV 82-1772 RMT (MCx) slip op. (C.D. Cal. Mar 7, 1985) [hereinafter Order Vacating 
Judgment]. 
108 Judgment by Default, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) 
[hereinafter Default Judgment]. 
109ld. 
110 [d. 
111 [d. at 1. Also named as defendants were the province of Tucuman, eight individuals, and an 
Argentine-owned corporation, Inmobiliaria Del Nor-Oeste, S.A. (Nor-Oeste). ld. Nor-Oeste was a 
closely held corporation owned by the Sidermans which had been seized by the new Argentine regime. 
[d. at 7. 
II. [d. at 2. 
mId. The government of Argentina refused to appear to contest the action at this point. [d. at 1-
2. Instead, it sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. State Department asserting sovereign immunity. ld. 
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tered a default judgment against Argentina, awarding approximately $2.7 mil-
lion in damages to Jose and Lea Siderman. 114 
Shortly after the default judgment was delivered, however, the court moved 
sua sponte to consider the issue of foreign sovereign immunity. I 15 On March 17, 
1985, the court issued an order vacating the default judgment and dismissing 
the case on grounds of sovereign immunity.1I6 
Using a two-part analysis, the court determined that no exception to immunity 
applied in the Siderman case.ll7 First, the court examined the ATCA in light of 
the rules of immunity prevailing in 1789, the year Congress enacted that statute. 
It concluded that the ATCA did not imply an exemption from immunity for 
claims arising under the statute. liB Second, the court held that none of the 
enumerated exceptions found in the FSIA were applicable, so that sovereign 
immunity barred the suit. 119 
3. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: A Possible Solution to 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity in ATCA Litigation? 
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics l20 was the first ATCA case in 
which a court found an exception to sovereign immunity. In Von Dardel, suit 
was brought on behalf of Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, by his half-
brother Guy Von Dardel and his legal guardian Sven Hagstrom. 121 The plaintiffs 
I14Id. at 8. The court awarded Jose Siderman a total of $2,607,515.63 in damages. Lea Siderman 
received an award of $100,000.00. Id. 
115 Order Vacating Judgment, supra note 107, slip op. at 1-2. Absence of foreign sovereign immunity 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a valid judgment. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5 (1983). 
116 Order Vacating Judgment, supra note 107, at 4. 
117 Id. at 2-3. 
118 !d. at 3. 
119Id. at 3-4. According to the Siderman court, the "only arguable exception" to immunity in that 
case was that an international agreement might remove immunity under FSIA § 1604. Id. The court 
found that the agreements cited by the Sidermans did not waive immunity. I d. As a result, the court 
ordered its previous default judgment vacated. !d. at 4. 
120 623 F. Supp. 246 (D:D.C. 1985). 
121 Id. at 248. Wallenberg was attached to the Swedish diplomatic corps in Budapest during World 
War II. Id. His station there resulted from a U.S. request that Sweden assist in saving from the Nazis 
those Jews then residing in Hungary. !d. As a neutral nation, Sweden maintained a diplomatic presence 
in Hungary, and therefore could exert efforts in achieving that end which were foreclosed to the 
United States. Id. 
During the six months between Wallenberg's arrival in Budapest and his arrest by the Soviets, he 
saved nearly one hundred thousand Jews. !d. at 249. He printed and issued thousands of Swedish 
passports, purchased or rented scores of houses in Budapest to be used as "safe houses" for refugees, 
and literally pulled people off concentration camp deportation trains. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 97-169, 
97th Congo 1st Sess. at 2 (1981)). Wallenberg repeatedly risked his own life taking these actions. As a 
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alleged that Wallenberg has suffered imprisonment and possibly death since his 
arrest in Hungary in 1945 by Soviet representatives. 122 
The plaintiffs contended that the offenses alleged, wrongful imprisonment 
and wrongful death, were "tort[s] ... committed in violation of the Law of 
Nations or a treaty of the United States."123 Because these torts violated Wallen-
berg's diplomatic immunity, the plaintiffs asserted subject matter jurisdiction 
under the ATCA.124 In addition, they asserted both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction under the FSIA.125 
In finding the FSIA's general grant of sovereign immunity inapplicable to 
the U.S.S.R., the Von Dardel decision suggests several theoretical bases for over-
coming the foreign sovereign immunity defense. First, Judge Barrington Parker 
found in Von Dardel that, because the FSIA incorporates the rules of customary 
international law, states are not immune for acts committed in clear violation 
of the law of nations. 126 Second, the court reasoned that, because the FSIA is 
limited by treaties to which the United States was a party at the time of its 
enactment, no immunity is accorded to acts which allegedly violate those trea-
ties. 127 Third, the court found that the U.S.S.R. had implicitly waived immunity 
under the FSIA by being party to those same treaties. 128 For these reasons, the 
court entered a default judgment in plaintiffs' favor. 129 
result of this heroism Wallenberg became, in 1981, the second person (Winston Churchill being the 
first) to be voted by Congress an honorary United States Citizen. [d. at 248 n.2. 
After the U.S.S.R. conquered Hungary in 1945, the Soviet occupation forces arrested Wallenberg 
despite his full entitlement to diplomatic immunity. [d. at 249. In 1957, a note to the Swedish embassy 
in Moscow from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko acknowledged that Wallenberg had 
indeed been imprisoned by the U.S.S.R. Gromyko asserted that Wallenberg had died in prison of 
natural causes in 1947. Id. Furthermore, Gromyko blamed Wallenberg's imprisonment on "criminal 
activity" by Viktor Abakumov, former Soviet Minister of State Security, who had been executed by the 
U.S.S.R. in 1953. Id. Nevertheless, between 1954 and 1981, a series of reports from former Soviet 
prisoners suggested that Wallenberg was in fact alive well after 1947. [d. at 249-50. 
122 [d. at 248. 
123 [d. at 250. For discussions of Von Dardefs interpretation of the ATCA, see Comment, Alien Tort 
Claims in the 1980's: Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 12 BROOKLYN j. INT'L L. 469 
(1986); Recent Development, 26 VA. j. INT'L L. 785 (1986). 
124Id. Von Dardel was a particularly good test case for litigating FSIA problems in human rights 
cases. Even the least expansive interpretation of the ATCA, that adopted by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren, 
would allow jurisdiction under the ATCA for "[v]iolation of safe-conducts" or "[i]nfringement of the 
rights of embassadors [sic]." 726 F.2d 774, 813-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,j., concurring). Thus, there 
was little chance of a court barring Von DardeCs claim for lack of ATCAjurisdiction and consequently 
not reaching the FSIA issue. 
125 623 F. Supp. at 250. 
126Id. at 254. 
127/d. at 255. The Von Dardel court specifically found that the Soviet Union had violated the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1973 Convention on Internationally Protected 
Persons, agreements to which both the United States and U.S.S.R. were party. Id. 
128 /d. at 256. 
129 [d. at 263. The U.S.S.R. declined to answer the complaint, its only response being a diplomatic 
letter asserting its absolute immunity from suit. [d. at 250. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The Von Dardel decision was, at the very least, contrary to the disposition of 
similar issues in Siderman. 13o While it is yet unclear whether Von Dardel will prove 
a workable model for resolving future sovereign immunity issues in ATCA 
cases,131 the approach used by the Von Dardel court merits closer examination 
in light of the FSIA's legislative and judicial history. 
The Von Dardel opinion suggests three novel approaches to the problem of 
sovereign immunity in ATCA or other human rights claims. First, it asserts that 
a sovereign may waive immunity by signing international human rights agree-
ments. 132 Second, Von Dardel held that an exception to sovereign immunity exists 
where the purposes of U.S. treaties in force in 1976133 would be frustrated by 
a grant of immunity.13' Finally, Judge Parker held that the incorporation into 
the FSIA of customary international law removes immunity where a violation 
of international law is alleged. 135 The following section of this Comment will 
examine these theories in light of the legislative and judicial history of the FSIA. 
A. Waiver of Immunity Under § J605(a)(1) 
Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA provides that a sovereign may waive its im-
munity from suit in the United States either explicitly or by implication. 136 In 
Von Dardel, Judge Parker noted that U.S. courts had "not yet fully explored" 
the notion that by signing an international agreement, a sovereign waives its 
immunity for claims alleged to arise under that agreement. 137 Indeed, some 
cases construing § 1605(a)(1) had expressly rejected this theory.13s 
130 The Siderman case is discussed supra, text accompanying notes 107-19. 
131 No appeal has yet been filed in this case, nor has there been any attempt to execute upon the 
judgment. 
132 623 F. Supp. at 256. 
m The year Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. FSIA § 1604 preserves the 
effectiveness of immunity waivers contained in such treaties. See discussion infra, text accompanying 
notes 182-236. 
134 623 F. Supp. at 254-55. 
135 [d. at 254. 
136 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l) states: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or 
of the States in any case -
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication. 
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver. 
28 usc. § 1605(a)(I) (1976). 
137 623 F. Supp. at 255. 
138 At the time Von Dardel was decided, no U.S. court had adopted the waiver interpretation suggested 
by Judge Parker. Moreover. the case of Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 
(7th Cir. 1985). had explicitly rejected finding a waiver of immunity in similar human rights agree-
ments. !d. at 378. Similarly. the Court in Siderman had at least implicitly rejected the rationale later 
approved by Von Dardel. See Order Vacating Judgment, supra note 107. at 4. 
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Nevertheless, the Von Dardel court, relying primarily upon the opinions of 
commentators I39 and the original order regarding jurisdiction in Siderman 140 
concluded that, by signing several international agreements concerning diplo-
matic immunity,I4I the Soviet Union impliedly waived sovereign immunity re-
specting alleged violations of those agreements. 142 "Any other result," warned 
Judge Parker, "would rob each of those agreements of substantive effect, and 
would render meaningless the act of the Soviet Union in signing them."143 
The legislative history of the FSIA is of little assistance in clarifying the 
meaning of implied waiver in human rights cases. The House Report accom-
panying the Act,I44 however, suggests a waiver might exist when a foreign state 
has (1) agreed to arbitration in a foreign country;I45 (2) agreed that the law of 
a particular country governs a contract;I46 or (3) filed a responsive pleading in 
an action without raising sovereign immunity.I47 
These exceptions appear to have been intended to apply in commercial 
litigation rather than human rights actions 148 and most of the cases construing 
§ 1605(a)(1) have been commercial disputes. I49 Nevertheless, one recent non-
ATCA human rights case has applied § 1605(a)(1) to a claim nearly identical to 
that in Von Dardel, though with a contrary result. I50 
In Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,I5I the American wife of a Soviet 
citizen charged the U.S.S.R. with illegally detaining her husband. I52 The plaintiff 
139 E.g., R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1979); 
Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International Human Rights Agreements: How They Co-
Exist, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 71 (1982). 
140 It is unclear why Judge Parker did not address the Order Vacating Judgment, supra note 107, 
in his opinion. 
141 The agreements relied upon in Von Dardel are cited supra at note 127. 
142 623 F. Supp. at 256. 
143Id. 
144 House Report, supra note 5, at 6617. 
145Id. [hereinafter "waiver by arbitration clause."] 
146Id. [hereinafter "waiver by choice of law clause."] 
147 !d. [hereinafter "waiver by responsive pleading."] 
148 The Von Dardel court itself noted that "Congress' primary concern [in enacting the FSIA] was to 
codify jurisdictional standards relating to the burgeoning area of commercial litigation against foreign 
governments." 623 F. Supp. at 254 n.8. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
149 See, e.g., Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Resource Dynamics Int'l, Ltd. v. General People's Comm. for Communications & Maritime 
Transport in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 593 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See also 
cases discussed infra at notes 162-75 and accompanying text. Of the dozens of cases construing 
§ 1605(a)(I), research disclosed only two, other than Von Dardel, which involved human rights claims. 
See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Berkovitz v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984). 
150 Frolova, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
151 !d. 
152Id. at 371. Frolova apparently claimed that her causes of action arose under the U.N. Charter 
and the Helsinki Accords, id. at 373, as well as under common law. Id. at 371. 
360 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. X, No.2 
alleged that, by signing the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Accords, the U.S.S.R. 
had waived its sovereign immunity with respect to claims involving violations of 
those two agreements. 153 The plaintiff therefore asserted jurisdiction under 
FSIA § 1605(a)(l ).15' 
The Frolova court rejected the plaintiff's arguments and declined to infer 
waiver.155 The court examined commercial cases in which plaintiffs alleged 
implied waiver either by contractual provision or treaty, and found that the 
implied waiver provision was to be narrowly cons~rued.156 Turning to the treaties 
cited by the plaintiff, the Frolova court declined to find an intentional and 
knowing relinquishment of immunity by the defendant. 157 According to the 
court, there was "absolutely no evidence from the language, structure or history 
of the agreements ... that implies a waiver" by the U.S.S.R.158 Moreover, be-
cause the agreements did not relate to adjudication,159 the Frolova court con-
cluded that the nations which signed them did not anticipate that the documents' 
provisions would be enforced by U.S. courtS.160 
Although Frolova was the leading pre-Von Dardel human rights case inter-
preting § 1605(a)(I)'s implied waiver provision, the issue of implied waiver had 
often been addressed in commercial cases. Holdings of implied waiver in such 
cases have been limited to the three situations suggested by the FSIA's legislative 
history: (I) waiver by arbitration clause, (2) waiver by choice of law clause and 
(3) waiver by responsive pleading. 161 
153 !d. at 373-78. The plaintiff also claimed jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA. Id. at 379. 
154 Id. at 376. 
155Id. at 378. 
156Id. at 377. 
157 !d. at 378. 
158Id. 
159Id. The Frolova court noted that there was no "reason to conclude that the ... parties to these 
agreements anticipated when signing them that American courts would be the means by which the 
documents' provisions would be enforced." [d. See also Harris v. V AO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 
1056, 1058 (E.D.N.V. 1979). In Harris, the court noted that "the [FSIA's] legislative history suggests 
that ... implicit waivers are reflected in actions relating to adjudication" and cited the three examples 
of implied waiver by arbitration clause, choice of law clause and failure to make responsive pleading. 
[d. 
160 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 378. 
161Id. at 377. See also Zernicek v. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), 614 F. Supp. 407, 411 (S.D. Tex. 
1985) ("[s]ince the FSIA became law, courts have been reluctant to stray beyond [the three cited] 
examples when considering claims that a nation has implicitly waived its defense of sovereign immu-
nity"). It should also be noted that a § 1605(a)(I) waiver, ifby treaty, may overlap to some extent with 
§ 1604's "subject to" exception. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376 n.9. The distinction between the two is 
that § 1605(a)(l) waiver by treaty applies where the sovereign defendant has signed the agreement, 
while § 1604's "subject to" exception applies only to those agreements to which the United States was 
party in 1976 (the year of the FSIA's enactment). For a discussion of cases involving § 1604, see infra 
text accompanying notes 182-236. 
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Generally, an agreement to arbitrate, standing alone, is sufficient implicitly to 
waive immunity.'62 This has been held true even where the agreement specifies 
a country other than the United States as a preferred forum for arbitration,'63 
an interpretation consistent with the FSIA's legislative history.'64 A majority of 
courts, however, have declined to recognize an implied waiver by arbitration 
clause unless the agreement suggests that the United States is at least contem-
plated as a forum. 165 
The implied waiver by choice of law clause has been interpreted in similar 
fashion. Thus, although an agreement to abide by the law of another country 
has been held to waive immunity even where that country is not the United 
States,166 the preferred view appears to be that U.S. law must be specified for 
waiver to be inferred from a choice of law clause. '67 
162 Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp. 311, 312 (D. D.C. 
1980). See also Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 
1175 (D.D.C. 1980), in which the court found implied waiver by arbitration clause where the sovereign 
agreed that arbitration should occur at a place specified either by the parties or by the arbitrators. Id. 
at 1178. The court held this language sufficiently broad to imply consent to adjudication of disputes 
in the United States. Id. 
16' Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (contract 
provision agreeing to submit all disputes to arbitration in Switzerland sufficiently broad to waive by 
implication defendant's sovereign immunity in the United States). Id. at 826. This decision is partic-
ularly significant because it apparently did not require that the United States be contemplated as a 
possible site of arbitration' in order to infer waiver. Instead, the Ipitrade holding suggests that immunity 
is impliedly waived whenever a sovereign submits to adjudication of disputes in another forum. This 
view seems to be the minority approach, however; several cases in which the court declined to find 
waiver in similar situations are cited infra at note 165. 
164 House Report, supra note 5, at 6617. 
165 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 377. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 
693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (agreement to submit future disputes 
to arbitration before the Int'l Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes does not waive sovereign's 
immunity in U.S. courts); Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 
(agreement to have disputes settled by Paris Int'l Court does not waive immunity in United States); 
Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (immunity 
not waived where arbitration clause d0es not expressly contemplate United States as forum). 
166 Ipitrade Int'l S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (Nigeria's 
agreement to adjudicate contractual disputes under Swiss law and to submit to arbitration by the Int'l 
Chamber of Commerce waived its immunity under the FSIA). 
167 Zernicek v. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), 614 F. Supp. 407, 411 (S.D. Tex. 1985) ("most courts 
have refused to find an implicit waiver of immunity to suit in American courts from a contract clause 
providing for arbitration in a country other than the United States"). See also Ohntrup v. Firearms 
Center, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981), in which the court stated: 
[AJ waiver of immunity by a state as to one jurisdiction cannot be interpreted to be a waiver 
as to all jurisdictions .... While it is reasonable to conclude that an agreement by a foreign 
country to either arbitrate disputes in or be governed by the laws of the United States 
constitutes an implicit waiver by that state of the defense of sovereign immunity in the courts 
of the United States, it is much more difficult to infer such a waiver from the agreement of 
a foreign state to submit itself, in the same manner, to the jurisdiction of a state other than 
the United States. 
Id. at 1285. 
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Failure to assert immunity as a defense in a responsive pleading is an unlikely 
basis for implying waiver in ATCA litigation, as most nations can be expected 
routinely to invoke the FSIA's protection. 168 Moreover, the few cases addressing 
this issue evidence a judicial reluctance to infer waiver from a sovereign defen-
dant's behavior. 169 Although some courts would allow greater judicial latitude 
in inferring waiver, 170 implied waiver by responsive pleading is generally difficult 
to establish. l7l 
Thus, the general principle of construction of § 1605(a)(1) in commercial 
cases is that implied waiver of sovereign immunity should not readily be in-
ferred.172 Because a waiver must be an intentional and knowing relinquishment 
of the legal right of immunity,173 implicit waivers must be reflected in actions 
relating to adjudication,174 and thus should not be inferred from unrelated 
actions. 175 
In conclusion, the legislative history of the FSIA strongly suggests that Con-
gress intended § 1605(a)(l)'s implied waiver provision to govern decisions on 
immunity in commercial disputes. 176 The three examples of implied waiver 
168 As one commentator has stated: 
[I]t is difficult to think of a state not ... asserting the [doctrine] of immunity .... If a state 
is really involved in a denial of human rights, it would be naive to think that it will not attempt 
to defeat the jurisdiction of the United States courts under [this] well-recognized [principle] 
of international law. 
Hassan, supra note 79, at 19. 
In addition, many sovereign defendants will simply choose not to appear in court. See infra note 
293. 
169 Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, S.A., 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 
1984) (sovereign's filing of pretrial motions over course of two years without raising defense of 
immunity is not waiver where no responsive pleading submitted); Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 
309 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (failure to answer in a timely manner does not waive defense of sovereign 
immunity). 
170 See, e.g., Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, S.A., 727 F.2d 274 
(2d Cir. 1984), in which it was recognized that the district judge had discretion to infer waiver, even 
though he chose not to do so. Id. at 278. 
171 See supra note 169. 
172 See, e.g., Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 590 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 
1984), and Paterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United Arrow, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), two cases involving boilerplate provisions in shipping contracts. In Transamencan, the foreign 
sovereign accepted a bill of lading that stated that its provisions were to be construed pursuant to U.S. 
maritime law. The court refused to infer waiver from this action of the foreign state and dismissed 
the case. Transamencan, 590 F. Supp. at 974. In Paterson, U.S. law required the sovereign to designate 
a U.S. agent for service of process pursuant to the federal Water Pollution Control Act. Additionally, 
the Paterson defendant accepted a bill of lading providing that all disputes arising under the bill be 
litigated in New York. As in Transamencan, the court found the sovereign's actions in Paterson insuf-
ficient to waive immunity. Paterson, 493 F. Supp. at 624-25. 
173 Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 309,312 (W.D. Tex. 1980). 
174 Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
175 See, e.g., Zernicek v. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), 614 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Tex. 1985), in which 
no implied waiver was found where the sovereign defendant allowed its contractor freedom to sub-
contract and the subcontract contained an agreement that U.S. law would govern all disputes. . 
176 See supra note 148. 
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suggested by the legislative history, waiver by arbitration clause, choice of law 
clause or responsive pleading,177 seem unlikely to arise in a human rights con-
text. Additionally, courts have been reluctant to interpret § 1605(a)(l) expan-
sively.178 In Frolova v. U.S.S.R.,179 a recent human rights case, the court refused 
to infer waiver in a situation similar to Von Dardel. 18o Courts in commercial cases 
have likewise hesitated to read § 1605(a)(l) broadly.181 Von Dardel consequently 
stands alone in finding that international agreements waive sovereign immunity 
for alleged violations of the rights they guarantee. 
B. The" Subject To" Exception to Immunity Under § 1604 
In Section 1604 of the FSIA the general immunity granted to foreign states 
is limited by existing international agreements to which the United States was 
a party in 1976 when Congress enacted the FSIA.182 In Von Dardel, the court 
interpreted § 1604's "subject to" provision183 more broadly than suggested by 
the legislative history. Legislative history indicates that Congress included this 
language merely to preserve then-existing waivers of immunity in U.S. treaties 
or other international agreements. 184 According to the Von Dardel court, the 
"subject to" provision did not refer to existing waivers of immunity alone. 185 
Instead, it suggested, this language required that the FSIA not be applied where 
it would frustrate the purpose of any international agreement to which the 
United States was party.186 
Judge Parker found two such agreements controlling in Von Dardel: the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1973 Convention on In-
177 For a discussion of cases construing implied waiver by arbitration clause, choice oflaw clause and 
responsive pleading, see supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text. 
178 For a discussion of commercial cases construing this statute, see supra notes 162, 163, 167, 170, 
172 and 175. 
179 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
180Id. at 378. Although the substantive claims alleged in Frolova differed from those in Von Dardel, 
both plaintiffs claimed the U.S.S.R. had waived sovereign immunity by signing international agree-
ments, the Helsinki accords and U.N. Charter in Frolova, id. at 373, and the 1961 Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Immunity and the 1973 Convention on Internationally Protected Persons in Von Dardel, 
623 F. Supp. 246, 255 (D.D.C. 1985). 
181 For a discussion of commercial cases construing § 1605(a)(l), see supra notes 162-71 and accom-
panying text. 
182 28 U .S.c. § 1604. 
183 Section 1604 of the FSIA provides: 
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is party at the time 
of enactment of this Act [October 21, 1976] a foreign state shall be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 
1605 to 1607 of this chapter [28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607]. 
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). 
184 House Report, supra note 5, at 6608, 6616. The legislative history of § 1604 is discussed infra, 
text accompanying notes 192-96. 
185 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254-55. 
186Id. 
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ternationally Protected Persons. 187 Finding that these agreements were designed 
to protect diplomats from offenses against them,'88 Judge Parker reasoned that 
[i]n order for the conventions to operate effectively, the perpetrators 
of such offenses must be subject to liability for their acts. To the 
extent that the FSIA would shield the Soviet Union from such 
liability, it is in conflict with the terms of the conventions and thwarts 
their effective operation. '89 
Judge Parker concluded that immunity under the FSIA must be limited in 
order to avoid such a result. 190 He therefore denied the Soviet Union immu-
nity.'91 
The legislative history of the FSIA suggests, however, that the "subject to" 
provision was intended simply to ensure the continued vitality of then-existing 
immunity waivers.'92 According to the House Report, immunity waivers con-
tained in such agreements would control only where they "expressly conflict" 
with a provision of the FSIA.'93 This "express conflict" condition may most 
reasonably be construed to require the agreement in question to concern sov-
ereign immunity; if not, any conflict would necessarily be by implication only.'94 
This interpretation is supported by Congress' citation of treaties "contain[ing] 
provisions relating to the immunity of foreign states" as the types of agreements 
contemplated by § 1604.195 The House Report states that "to the extent such 
international agreements are silent on a question of immunity, the [FSIA] would 
control; the international agreement would control only where a conflict was 
manifest."'96 Although the Von Dardel court expressly rejects limiting § 1604 to 
this role,'97 this view is contrary to the majority of cases construing this provi-
sion. 198 





192 House Report, supra note 5, at 6608,6616. 
193 [d. at 6616. 
194 This "conflict by implication" is, of course, the very interpretation of § 1604's language accepted 
by the Von Dardel court. See supra text accompanying notes 186-89. 
195 House Report, supra note 5, at 6616. 
196 [d. 
197 623 F. Supp. at 255 n.1O The Von Dardel court acknowledged that "[t]he House Report would 
limit the immunity of a foreign state under the Act to cases of an express or manifest conflict between 
the provisions of the Act and those of an international agreement or treaty." /d. The court nonetheless 
concluded that "[g]iven the clear and unambiguous language of the statute ... resort to the legislative 
history is in this instance unnecessary for interpretive purposes. " [d. See also supra text accompanying 
notes 186-9 \. 
198 See, e.g., Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1984); Mashayekhi v. 
Iran, 515 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1981). In Berkovitz the court read the language of the Treaty of Amity 
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One possible exception to this general rule that § 1604's "subject to" provision 
refers only to treaties expressly concerning sovereign immunity is suggested by 
Frolova v. U.S.S.R.!99 Although the issue was not addressed in Von Dardel, the 
Frolova opinion implies that a U.S. treaty may divest a sovereign of immunity 
under § 1604 if it is self-executing.20o 
A self-executing treaty is one which imposes substantive obligations upon its 
signatories without the need of implementing legislation.20 ! If a self-executing 
treaty concerns human rights, these rights would inhere directly in the individ-
ual, and a victim of human rights violations could presumably sue directly upon 
his rights under the treaty. 
In Frolova, the U.S. plaintiff sued the U.S.S.R., alleging that its refusal to 
allow her Soviet husband to emigrate was a violation of international law. 202 She 
argued that Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter as well as certain provisions 
of the Helsinki Accords stripped the U.S.S.R. of its sovereign immunity in any 
claim alleging a violation of those agreements.203 
The Frolova court found no exception to immunity under § 1604,204 basing 
its decision on findings that the agreements relied upon by the plaintiff were 
"not self-executing."205 Because the agreements did "not create rights enforce-
able by private litigants in American courts," they could not divest a sovereign 
of its immunity.206 
between the United States and Iran literally in holding that Iran's waiver under the treaty extended 
only to enterprises of Iran. and not to Iran itself. 735 F.2d at 333. Similarly. in Mashayekhi the court 
limited application of the treaty's waiver to agencies and instrumentalities of Iran engaged in com-
merce. 515 F. Supp. at 43. But see Behring Int'l Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 
(D.N.]. 1979). In Behring, a similar "subject to" provision in FSIA § 1609 regarding attachment was 
broadly read so as to allow prejudgment attachment in the absence of the explicit waiver usually 
required. Id. at 395. 
199 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
200Id. at 373-76. See infra text accompanying notes 202-16. 
201 Non-self-executing treaties, by comparison, merely express the signatories' approval of the agree-
ments' terms and their willingness to promulgate implementing legislation. Absent ratification, how-
ever, a non-self-executing treaty creates no enforceable rights. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 2, at 97-
98. 
202 761 F.2d 370, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1985). 
203/d. at 373-75. Article 55 of the Charter provides: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote .... universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 
Article 56 provides: 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. 
U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56. 
204 761 F.2d at 372. 
205Id. at 375. 
206Id. at 373-76. See also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), which found the 
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The court nevertheless implied that, had the treaties in question been self-
executing, they would indeed have stripped the U .S.S.R. of its immunity in that 
case.207 Such an interpretation offers qualified support for Von Dardel's view that 
§ 1604's "subject to" provision should be construed more expansively than it 
previously had been.20B 
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing, courts will consider several 
factors, among them: 
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the ob-
ligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasi-
bility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications 
of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the 
judiciary to resolve the dispute .... Of course, if the parties' intent 
is clear from the treaty's language courts will not inquire into the 
remaining factors. 209 
Application of these criteria to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Immunity and the 1973 Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, the 
two agreements cited by the Von Dardel plaintiffs, yields contrasting results. 
The 1973 Convention appears not to be self-executing because its language 
implies that the agreement was not intended to create enforceable rights. Article 
2 of the Convention provides that violations of its terms "[s]hall be made by 
each State Party a crime under its internal law."210 The Convention therefore 
probably does not create enforceable rights, since a treaty providing that sig-
1907 Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention non-self-executing and therefore not a 
basis for a cause of action in a class action suit under 28 U .S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a)(2) against an 
alleged Nazi war criminal. 
207 This rationale is implicit in the Frolova court's concentration on the self-execution issue in its 
discussion of § 1604. 761 F.2d 373-76. Additionally, the Frolova opinion states in a footnote that "if 
an international agreement is self executing [it] may therefore be the basis of an action under 1604." 
Id. at 376 n.9. Moreover, the note goes on to assert that a self-executing treaty "almost certainly waives 
sovereign immunity under § 1605(a)(I)." /d. 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 185-9\. 
209 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373. 
210 In pertinent part, Article 2 provides that: 
I. The intentional commission of: 
(a) A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally 
protected person; 
(b) A violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of 
transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his person or liberty; 
(c) A threat to commit any such attack; 
(d) An attempt to commit any such attack; and 
(e) An act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such attack shall be made by 
each State Party a crime under its internal law. 
2. Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by appropriate penalties which take 
into account their grave nature. 
1973 U.N.Y.B. 775 [hereinafter 1973 Convention]. 
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natories are to take measures through their own laws to enforce its provisions 
is by its own terms non-self-executing.211 
The 1961 Vienna Convention,212 however, is more likely to be interpreted as 
self-executing. Its language suggests that the rights it enumerates are intended 
to inhere directly in individuals213 without implementing legislation.214 In ad-
dition, the Vienna Convention states that its guaranteed rights may be waived 
only by the state sending the diplomat. 215 This provision supports the interpre-
tation that these rights were intended to be enforceable even absent imple-
menting legislation. Finally, the historical recognition of diplomatic immunity 
under customary international law suggests that the Convention be viewed as 
merely codifying accepted principles of the law of nations.216 Accordingly, courts 
could resolve disputes under the terms of the Convention with little fear of 
unduly disturbing or overturning established principles of international law. 
Thus, if the Vienna Convention is found to be self-executing, Frolova implies 
that it may properly divest signatories of immunity in cases like Von Dardel.217 
In this respect, however, Frolova reads § 1604 more expansively than other cases 
construing this statute. In Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran,218 for example, the plaintiffs brought suit against the Republic of Iran and 
seven Iranian-controlled corporations alleging breach of contract, lost profits, 
conversion and expropriation of funds. 219 The court rejected the plaintiffs' 
theory that the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran waived 
211 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, j., concurring). 
212 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502 500 
U.N.T.S. 96, 23 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
m Article 29 of the Vienna Convention states that "[t]he person of a diplomatic agent shall be 
inviolable." Id. at art. 29. 
214Id. at art. 39(1). 
215Id. at art. 32(1). 
216 "The law [of diplomatic relations] has now been codified to a considerable extent in the Vienna 
Convention." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 333. 
217 It is not entirely clear whether § 1604 requires the sovereign defendant to have been a party to 
the applicable agreement. The statutory language merely provides that a foreign state's immunity is 
"subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is party at the time of [the FSIA's 
enactment in 1976]." 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) (emphasis added). A strict interpretation of this provision 
would not seem to require that the sovereign defendant have been a party to the agreement in question 
for § 1604 to apply. This approach, when combined with Von DardeCs expansive reading of § 1604's 
immunity exception, would divest a state of immunity for any violation of a pre-1976 U.S. treaty even 
though that state had never signed the agreement. 
Judge Parker seems to recognize the harshness of such a rule, carefully noting that the result in 
Von Dardel "is particularly just since the Soviet Union is a party to both [the Vienna Convention and 
the 1973 Convention]." Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255. Even this language suggests, however, that 
the result in Von Dardel would have been the same even had the Soviet Union not been a party to those 
agreements. 
218 506 F. Sup~. 981 (N.D. III. 1980). 
219/d. at 982. 
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Iran's immunity.220 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited its "substantial 
doubt" whether the Treaty's waiver of immunity covered acts of Iran within its 
own borders.22l The court also found it significant that, when the Treaty was 
signed, U.S. law required a plaintiff to demonstrate an independent basis for 
personal jurisdiction aside from any waiver of sovereign immunity.222 It there-
fore found "no basis for assuming that the contracting parties to the Treaty, by 
their silence, intended to consent to personal jurisdiction. "223 
The court in In the Matter of Rio Grande Transport, Inc. 224 displayed a similar 
disinclination to construe § 1604 expansively. In a maritime dispute, the Rio 
Grande plaintiffs argued that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas225 
created an exception to immunity under § 1604.226 Although Article 9 of that 
Convention provides for the absolute immunity from suit of government-owned 
ships engaged in non-commercial activity,227 the Convention was silent as to the 
immunity of government-owned ships engaged in commercial service.228 The 
plaintiffs contended that the Convention waived immunity in such situations, 
relying on the United States' express objection to a contrary interpretation when 
it signed that document.229 The court rejected this logic, finding that "objections 
by the United States to the position of other signatories can hardly be considered 
part of an international agreement."230 
Thus, most cases construing § 1604's "subject to" provision would restrict its 
function to simply preserving waivers of sovereign immunity in force at the 
time of the FSIA's enactment.231 Nevertheless, the broader reading adopted by 
Judge Parker in Von Dardel is not entirely without support in the case law. The 
case of Frolova v. U.S.S.R.232 suggests that a self-executing treaty may operate 
to waive sovereign immunity respecting violations of its terms.233 Although the 
220 [d. at 987. 
221 [d. at 984. 
222 [d. at 985. In contrast, under present law (FSIA §§ 1330, 1605(a)(I)) waiver of immunity estab-
lishes both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See supra note 54. 
223 506 F. Supp. at 985. As a long-arm statute, the FSIA is subject to the jurisdictional due process 
requirements of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny. House 
Report, supra note 5, at 6612. 
224 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
225 Convention on the High Seas done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention]. 
226 516 F. Supp. at 1160. 
227 High Seas Convention, supra note 225, at art. 9. 
228 [d., passim. 
229 [d., 450 U.N.T.S. at 167. The Soviet bloc signed the agreement subject to the reservation that 
immunity be extended to commercial as well as noncommercial service. The United States signed with 
an express objection to this reservation. [d. 
230 516 F. Supp. at 1160 (emphasis in original). 
231 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
232 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985). 
m[d. at 376 n.9. See also supra text accompanying notes 204-08. 
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Von Dardel court did not address this issue, it seems possible that at least one of 
the two treaties relied upon by the Von Dardel plaintiffs, the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Immunity, is self-executing.234 The holding in Von 
Dardel is therefore not entirely without precedent. It should be noted, however, 
that this expansive reading of § 1604 conflicts with the narrower interpretation 
of that statute suggested by its legislative history235 and other case law.236 
C. Incorporation of Customary International Law: An Exception to Sovereign 
Immunity? 
The Von Dardel court reasoned that, because the FSIA must incorporate 
prevailing standards of international law, immunity does not extend to acts 
which violate those standards.237 In Von Dardel, Judge Parker held that because 
the FSIA should be interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with the law 
of nations,23B the statute should be read not to extend immunity to clear viola-
tions of universally recognized principles of international law.239 The implica-
tions of this "incorporation" theory are extremely significant. Such reasoning, 
if adopted, would ensure that any claim that could be brought under the ATCA 
would now be allowable under the FSIA.240 The reasoning of Von Dardel there-
fore should be closely scrutinized. 
While the incorporation theory rests upon Congress' express intent that the 
FSIA reflect existing standards of internationallaw,241 Judge Parker interprets 
this to mean that no immunity applies to alleged violations of international 
254 See supra text accompanying note 209 for a list of factors which courts will consider in determining 
whether a treaty is self-executing. 
255 See supra text accompanying notes 192-96. 
256 See supra text accompanying notes 218-30. 
257 623 F. Supp. at 254. 
2581d. at 253. 
2391d. at 254. This would also apply to any treaty of the United States if self-executing or imple-
mented by legislation: 
The purpose for including the reference [to future international agreements in a previous 
version of the "subject to" clause] was to take into account the possibility that sovereign 
immunity might become the subject of an international convention. Such a convention would, 
under Article VI of the constitution, take precedence, whether or not the bill was made 
expressly subject to a future international agreement. 
House Report, supra note 5, at 6608. 
240 Under Von Dardel, the FSIA would establish subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts over any 
suit in which a foreign state or its agency is charged with a violation of international law. Von Dardel, 
623 F. Supp. at 254. The FSIA would therefore establish U.S. jurisdiction over any claim which could 
currently be brought under the ATCA-specifically, those suits alleging "tort[s] ... committed in 
violation of the law of nations." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). Von Dardel's interpretation of the FSIA thus 
would render the ATCA almost completely superfluous as a jurisdictional tool. 
241 623 F. Supp. at 253. According to the Von Dardel court, "Congress explicitly anticipated [the 
incorporation theory], stating its intent that the Act ,[incorporated] standards recognized under inter-
national law.'" ld. (quoting House Report, supra note 5, at 6613). 
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law.242 Von Dardel cites the principle of universal jurisdiction over certain viola-
tions of internationallaw243 as one of the standards incorporated into the FSIA244 
and concludes that incorporation of such standards into the FSIA waives im-
munity for any violation of international law. 245 It is not at all apparent, however, 
that Von Dardel fairly characterizes Congress' intent. 
The House Report on the FSIA indeed states that Congress intended the Act 
to reflect existing standards of international law. 246 The context of this statement 
regarding incorporation of international legal standards strongly suggests, how-
ever, that Congress was referring solely to international principles of sovereign 
immunity.247 For example, the House Report indicates that the FSIA is intended 
to codify the "'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity as presently recog-
nized in internationallaw."248 Von Dardel cites no authority to the effect that the 
restrictive principle, as recognized in 1976, provided for automatic waiver of 
sovereign immunity in cases alleging a breach of an internationally recognized 
duty.249 
242 623 F. Supp. at 254. 
243Id. The principle of universal jurisdiction is a rule of international law categorizing certain types 
of conduct which any sovereign may legitimately regulate. The definition of the term quoted in Von 
Daniel states that "[a] state may exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized 
by the community of nations as of universal concern." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES, (REVISED) § 404 (Tent. Draft No.2, 1981). Another authority states that principles 
of universal jurisdiction "determine under what circumstances and to what extent a state may partic-
ipate in the repression of the particular crime" in question. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES 
& MATERIALS ON THE INT'L LEGAL SYSTEM 121 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter SWEENEY]. Among the 
offenses which are recognized subjects of universal jurisdiction are genocide, hijacking, slave trade, 
and acts of violence against diplomats. I d. 
244 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254. 
245Id. 
246 House Report, supra note 5, at 6613. 
247Id. After noting that "decisions of claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made 
by the judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards recognized under 
international law," the House Report devotes a paragraph to a discussion of international standards 
of sovereign immunity, and nowhere mentions or implies a general incorporation of all rules of 
international law. Id. 
248 House Report, supra note 5, at 6605. 
249 In 1976, when Congress enacted the FSIA, the major sovereign immunity controversy was 
whether a state's traditional immunity for commercial acts should be abolished. See, e.g., House Report, 
supra note 5, at 6605; 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 319-27; G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INT'L LAW 147 (2d ed. 1970). Even after 1976, authorities focused on 
the commercial/public distinction as the major point of controversy in the international law of sovereign 
immunity. See generally G. BADR, supra note 10. See also G. VON GLAHN, supra note 37, at 142-48. None 
of these authorities even addressed the issue of whether immunity should be denied for any act in 
violation of international law. 
Notably, even such a well-known advocate of international human rights as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
did not support so great a diminution of sovereign immunity in the name of human rights as advised 
by Von Dardel. Although arguing for a considerably restricted view of sovereign immunity, Lauterpacht 
acknowledged that: 
there must be immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the executive and administrative acts 
of the foreign State within its territory, such as alleged ... wrongful imprisonment .... In 
particular, no action should lie with regard to torts committed by foreign States and their 
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Although the Von Dardel court failed to cite any case or principle of interna-
tionallaw directly supporting the incorporation theory,250 it did argue by anal-
ogy to similar cases. For example, the court quoted Justice White's dissent in 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino25 I for the proposition that sovereign power 
must be exercised consistently with rules of international law.252 It should be 
noted, however, that Justice White was referring to application of the Act of 
State Doctrine,253 a judicially created principle of abstention, rather than to the 
FSIA, a statute enacted by Congress.254 
The Von Dardel court also cited the case of Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Ameri-
kaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij255 as supporting the "incorporation theory."256 
Bernstein involved a claim that the Nazi government had wrongfully seized the 
plaintiff's property because he was Jewish. The District Court in Bernstein ini-
tially held that the case could not be heard because of the Act of State Doc-
organs in their own territory. These .Dust be left either to judicial remedies within that foreigH 
State or to appropriate diplomatic action in accordance with the accepted practice of diplo-
matic protection of citizens abroad. 
Lauterpacht, The Problem of jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220 (1951), 
reprinted in 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, INT'L LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 
315,334 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1977). 
But see Paust, Federal jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign 
Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191,220-42 
(1983). Professor Paust contends in his article that the Von Dardel doctrine of non-immunity for 
violations of international law has long been recognized in one form or another. 
250 Judge Parker cited two authorities in support of his "incorporation" theory. See R. LILLICH & F. 
NEWMAN, INT'L HUMAN R,GHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1979); Comment, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act and International Human Rights Agreements: How They Co-Exist, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 71 (1982). 
For another article supporting the reasoning of Von Dardel, see Paust, supra note 249, at 220-42. It is 
surprising that the Von Dardel opinion does not cite Professor Paust's article, since it is an exhaustively 
documented argument against granting immunity to human rights violators. Drawing extensively 
upon the works of commentators and inferences drawn from U.S. court decisions, Professor Paust 
presents a persuasive argument for the view of sovereign immunity adopted by Von Dardel. Neverthe-
less, from 1976 when the FSIA was enacted to 1985, when Von Dardel was decided, no U.S. court had 
adopted Professor Paust's view of immunity. For discussion of cases rejecting the approach suggested 
by Professor Paust and followed in Von Dardel, see notes 151-60,204-06,266-80 and accompanying 
text. 
251 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
252 Id. at 457 (White, J., dissenting). 
253 The Act of State Doctrine is a common law principle counseling judges to refrain from consid-
ering a case if a decision on the merits would require judgment on the legality of a sovereign act of a 
foreign state or its agent within that state's borders. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 494-95. 
254 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. The Supreme Court has stated that the Act of State Doctrine merely 
"expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the 
validity of foreign acts of state" may unduly intrude upon the area of foreign policy. Id. The Doctrine 
does, however, have "constitutional underpinnings," id., although its application is "compelled by 
neither international law nor the Constitution." Id. at 427. It should also be noted that the merits of 
Justice White's position are still in dispute. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 
406 U.S. 759 (1972). In First National, fo.ur justices on a divided court followed the Sabbatino majority; 
three, including Justice White, adopted the Bernstein exception; one (Powell) followed White's dissent 
in Sabbatino; and Justice Douglas concurred on unrelated grounds. 
255 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). 
256 623 F. Supp. at 253. 
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trine.257 Subsequently, however, the court reversed its holding of nonjusticiabil-
ity.258 In doing so, the Bernstein court relied upon a U.S. Department of State 
letter advising it that the Executive branch's policy was "to relieve American 
courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon 
the validity of the acts of Nazi officials."259 
The Von Dardel court's reliance on this case is problematic. Bernstein, like 
Sabbatino, involved the Act of State Doctrine, not sovereign immunity.260 In 
addition, the Bernstein court had been advised by the State Department that the 
Act of State Doctrine need not be applied in deference to the Executive's 
jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign affairs. 261 No such circumstances coun-
seled judicial involvement in Von Dardel. Rather, strong arguments may be made 
for noninterference by courts in international human rights disputes.262 
Another major difficulty with Von Dardel's "incorporation" theory is that, in 
FSIA § 1605(a)(3),263 Congress specifically included an exception to immunity 
in cases where property is expropriated in violation of internationallaw.264 This 
clearly lessens the force of Von Dardel's logic, for if Von Dardel is correct, 
§ 1605(a)(3) becomes redundant. If all violations of international law waive 
immunity under the FSIA, as Von Dardel asserts, it is unclear why Congress 
should specify any particular type of violation as effecting such a waiver. Had 
Congress truly intended that any alleged violation of international law operate 
to waive immunity, it would have had no reason to include FSIA § 1605(a)(3).265 
'57 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947). 
'58 Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatshappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 
1954). 
'59 State Dept. Press Release, April 27, 1949, 20 DEP'T ST. BULL. 592. 
'60 210 F.2d at 375. 
261 [d. at 376. 
'6' See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring); id. at 823-27 (Robb, j., concurring); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
263 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976) . 
• 64 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) reads: 
ld . 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or 
of the States in any case -
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that 
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or 
that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged 
in a commercial activity in the United States. 
• 65 It is unclear whether there are any offenses for which a foreign state could retain immunity after 
Von Dardel. That decision implies a view of sovereign immunity so constricted as to be virtually 
nonexistent. In addition to the enumerated FSIA exceptions to immunity, a sovereign would be 
amenable to suit for any violation of customary international law, any act contrary to the provisions 
of a pre-1976 U.S. treaty or international agreen.'!nt, and any acts in violation of an international 
agreement which it has signed. Presumably, a sovereign would retain immunity for violations of 
municipal law. It is difficult, however, to envision any such offense which could not be rendered 
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In addition, courts have consistently refused to assert jurisdiction in the face 
of arguments simil~r to those which prevailed in Von Dardel. In Berkovitz v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran266 the plaintiffs, the widow and children of a retired U.S. 
Air Force officer, alleged that his wrongful death was caused by the Iranian 
government and its agent, a revolutionary group.267 Among the plaintiffs' ar-
guments against sovereign immunity was the claim that the "private and un-
friendly nature of political assassinations" should divest Iran of its immunity.268 
The Berkovitz court rejected this argument. Although failing to address di-
rectly the issue of whether violations of international law deprive a nation of 
immunity under the FSIA, the Berkovitz opinion does support the broader 
proposition that the nature of an alleged tort is immaterial to jurisdictional 
analysis.269 Because none of the FSIA's enumerated exceptions to immunity 
applied in Berkovitz, the court considered it irrelevant that the torts alleged in 
that case were of a "private and unfriendly nature."270 By implication, it would 
be equally irrelevant were the acts complained of violations of international law. 
Because the FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive standards" for resolving 
questions of sovereign immunity in U.S. courts,27J a sovereign is immune for 
all acts not falling within an FSIA exception.272 
justiciable by asserting some colorable nexus between it and some exception to immunity under the 
Von Dardel rule. C[ Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (defendant's 
passport violation while smuggling plaintiff's daughter into United States held a sufficiently related 
violation of international law to establish ATCAjurisdiction over child custody suit). 
266 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984). cert. denied. 469 U.S. 1035 (1984). 
267 [d. at 330. Kavin. the revolutionary group named as Iran's agent. "distribut[ed] ... posters 
pointing out Berkovitz's Jewish background. accusing him of spying and warning him or other 
Americans to leave Iran." [d. 
268 [d. at 331. 
269 [d. This principle was reiterated by the court in Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran. 729 F.2d 
835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying note 280. 
270 Berkovitz. 735 F.2d at 331. By characterizing political assassination as a "private" act. the Berkovitz 
plaintiffs appeared to suggest that Iran's actions fell under the rubric of acts jure gestionis (private acts). 
for which a sovereign is not immune under the restrictive theory of immunity. 
It is true that the traditional restrictive doctrine of immunity distinguishes between acts jure gestionis. 
for which a sovereign is not immune. and acts jure imperii. for which nations retain immunity. House 
Report. supra note 5. at 6605. It is nonetheless clear that jure gestionis traditionally refers to commercial 
acts only. [d. Extending the concept of acts jure gestionis to embrace acts such as political assassinations 
is problematic for two reasons. 
First. this interpretation of jure gestionis is inconsistent with the purpose of the FSIA. which was 
intended primarily to assist commercial plaintiffs in gaining jurisdiction over foreign states. See supra 
notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
Second. it is not at all apparent that there is anything inherently "private" about political assassina-
tions. Admittedly. it is increasingly difficult to confine the effects of political violence to public figures. 
as evidenced by the increase in terrorist activities. The same could be said. however. of countless acts 
of a sovereign. such as acts of warfare. universally regarded as public. It is therefore difficult to 
envision how. absent a complete transformation of the law of sovereign immunity. the theory implied 
by the Berkovitz plaintiffs could be accepted as a rule of sovereign immunity in U.S. courts. 
271 House Report. supra note 5. at 6610. 
272 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria. 461 U.S. 480.485 ("if none of the exceptions to 
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Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran273 addresses the "incorporation" issue more 
directly. Persinger arose out of the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, 
Iran. The plaintiffs, a former hostage and his parents, alleged injuries suffered 
during the takeover resulting from actions of the Iranian government or its 
agents in violation of international law and various treaties. 274 Although the 
plaintiffs' primary basis for pleading jurisdiction under the FSIA was the non-
commercial tort exception,275 they also argued that jurisdiction should lie be-
cause the attack on the Embassy was an international crime276 over which "every 
nation has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce laws."277 
Judge Bork, writing for the majority, dismissed this argument. 278 Although 
conceding that the alleged actions of the Iranian defendants clearly violated 
international law, the Persinger court found this fact insufficient to overcome 
Iran's assertion of immunity under the FSIA.279 According to Judge Bork, 
"neither the substantive basis of the tort, nor the seriousness of the crime, IS 
relevant to the question of jurisdiction."28o 
Finally, one subsequently decided case has expressly rejected the "incorpo-
ration" theory relied upon in Von Dardel. In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic,281 a shipping company brought an ATCA claim for damages 
arising out of Argentina's unprovoked attacks on the plaintiff's cargo ship 
during the Falklands/Malvinas war.282 The Amerada Hess plaintiff based its ar-
gument against allowing Argentina sovereign immunity upon the "in corpora-
sovereign immunity set forth in the [FSIA] applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction"). 
27' 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
27. I d. at 836-37. 
27; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Section 1605(a)(5) allows jurisdiction over a foreign state for noncom-
mercial torts occurring in U.S. territory. The Persinger plaintiffs argued that, because the alleged 
injuries to Sergeant Persinger had occurred on U.S. embassy grounds, § 1605(a)(5) divested Iran of 
its immunity. Persinger, 729 F.2d at 839. Alternatively, Sergeant Persinger's parents claimed that, 
because they suffered mental and emotional distress within the United States, § 1605(a)(5) should 
enable them to bring their claims. Id. at 842. The Persinger court rejected both arguments. Id. at 842-
43. 
276 The Int'l Court of Justice so ruled in Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.]. 200, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 553 (1980) [hereinafter Consular Case]. 
277 729 F.2d at 843 n.12. 
278 !d. 
279 !d. 
280Id. Persinger is factually similar to Von Dardel because the international crimes of which Iran was 
guilty comprised the very same offenses alleged in Von Dardel; namely, violation of diplomatic immunity 
as guaranteed by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 215, and the 1973 
Convention, supra note 210. Nevertheless, even though Persinger was controlling authority, the Von 
Dardel court declined to adopt its reasoning, holding that to do so would, in effect, repeal the ATCA. 
623 F. Supp. at 254. 
281 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
282Id. at 74. 
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tion" theory.283 The court rejected this argument, which it deemed to have been 
"incorrectly" accepted in Von Dardel,284 stressing that "nothing in the FSIA or 
its legislative history supports" the incorporation theory.285 
Several factors favor adoption of this view that issues of jurisdiction and 
immunity should be unaffected by the nature of the alleged act and whether it 
violates international law. A substantial number of countries still adhere to the 
absolute theory of sovereign immunity, at least in principle.286 Although perhaps 
espoused by a minority of nations today, the absolute theory is nonetheless an 
aceepted principle of international law squarely conflicting with the Von Dardel 
halding. Moreover, the Von Dardel opinion fails to cite any instance where 
immunity was withheld from a sovereign because its alleged actions were vio-
lations of international law.287 
The practice of the International Court of Justice is another factor weighing 
against adopting Von Dardel as a model for determining sovereign immunity. 
That tribunal, which exclusively considers questions of international law, admits 
to having no jurisdiction over sovereigns except by their consent. 288 This further 
suggests that little support exists in international law for the view of sovereign 
immunity articulated in Von Dardel. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The case of Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R. represents a significant development in the 
U.S. law of sovereign immunity, as embodied in the Foreign Sovereign Immun-
ities Act. In delivering a default judgment against the Soviet Union for violation 
of diplomatic immunity, the Von Dardel court ruled that (1) because the FSIA 
incorporates international law, a nation is not immune from suit for violations 
283Id. at 76-77. 
284 !d. at 77. 
285 !d. 
286 It is unclear precisely how many adherents the absolute theory still retains. One commentator 
suggests that "the majority of nations" still adhere to the doctrine of absolute immunity, at least in 
principle. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 37, at 145. Another authority, while noting the "quantum increase" 
in the number of states applying the restrictive doctrine, admits that an unspecified number of states, 
"belong[ing] mainly to the Socialist bloc or the newly independent states of Africa or Asia," still "persist 
in proclaiming their adherence to the absolute doctrine of state immunity." G. BADR, supra note 10, 
at 39. 
287 Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 253-54. The court relied instead on the Bernstein case and Justice 
White's dissent in Sabbatino, two opinions addressing the Act of State doctrine. These cases are discussed 
supra at text accompanying notes 251-62. 
288 The Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice, art. 36, para. I, restricts the court's jurisdiction to (1) 
cases referred to it by the parties; (2) special matters provided for in the U.N. Charter; and (3) cases 
which the parties agree by treaty to submit to the court. Id. Article 36, paras. 2 and 3 of the Statute 
provide that states may submit themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice, either unconditionally, or on condition that the opposing party has made a similar agree-
ment.ld. at paras. 2, 3. 
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of customary international law; (2) by signing an international agreement, a 
nation waives its immunity under FSIA § 1605(a)(l) respecting violations of that 
agreement; and (3) in cases where a finding of sovereign immunity would 
frustrate the purpose of an international agreement signed by the United States 
prior to enactment of the FSIA, § 1604 of the Act prevents a finding of im-
munity. Although the last of these three theories finds some support in the case 
of Frolova v. U.S.S.R., other cases construing § 1604 suggest a narrower reading 
of that statute. Moreover, Von Dardel's "incorporation" and implied waiver the-
ories run counter to both the FSIA's legislative history and available case law. 
Despite the Von Dardel reasoning being either weakly supported or flatly 
contradicted by available authority, significant policy considerations nevertheless 
may counsel adoption of Von Dardel's approach. First, a legitimate concern for 
eliminating injustice renders Von Dardel's "incorporation" theory an attractive 
reformulation of sovereign immunity law. In addition to its ethical attractiveness, 
the theory has a plausible theoretical basis. One commentator, discussing an 
analogous issue,2s9 surmises that jurisdiction could be asserted on the basis of a 
quid pro quo: the United States, in return for allowing alien defendants to 
establish their presence within its borders, should be entitled to assert jurisdic-
tion over such defendants for their violations of internationallaw.290 
There are, however, countervailing policy arguments. First, the adoption of 
Von Dardel would tend to embroil the judiciary in international disputes, thereby 
impinging upon the Executive branch's exclusive control of foreign affairs. 
Because it is unlikely that Congress intended such a result when it enacted the 
FSIA,291 several jurists have argued that separation-of-powers concerns preclude 
U.S. courts deciding such cases.292 
Moreover, it is questionable whether implementing the Von Dardel approach 
would have any real effect on human rights violators, absent a general accep-
tance of Judge Parker's doctrine throughout the international community. To 
the extent that the deterrent effect of allowing suit against sovereigns for human 
rights violations depends upon the threat of execution upon judgments, such 
deterrence is unlikely to be any more effective than in the analogous case of 
unilateral economic sanctions. Alternatively, to the extent that such suits are 
merely intended as an instrument of moral censure, there is no reason to 
289 Specifically, the commentator proposes a theoretical justification for asserting ATCA jurisdiction 
over the PLO in the Tel-Oren case. See D'Amato, supra note 2, at 93-94. 
290 [d. 
291 See House Report, supra note 5, at 6606. Congress specifically intended the Act to "reduc[ e 1 the 
foreign policy implications of immunity determinations" by removing the Department of State from 
the process of determining immunity. /d. 
292 See cases cited supra note 262. 
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suppose they will be any more effective than the tools presently at the United 
States' disposaJ.293 
The conflicting considerations outlined above might perhaps best be recon-
ciled by means of an international agreement on the subject of sovereign im-
munity. Such an approach was suggested as early as 1951 by Sir Hersch Lau-
terpacht. According to Lauterpacht, it would be "in the long run undesirable 
that the modification of [the sovereign immunity 1 doctrine should take place by 
way of national action which is unilateral, sporadic and unco-ordinated."294 
Because the "lack of uniformity" resulting from such an approach "would be 
bound to contribute to friction and confusion," Lauterpacht urged that any 
reform in the doctrine of sovereign immunity be accomplished by means of an 
international agreement on the subject.295 Such a course, were it feasible, would 
avoid the many pitfalls implicit in the approach recommended by Von Dardel. 
Ultimately, then, the problem of foreign sovereign immunity which currently 
faces human rights claimants under the Alien Tort Claims Act is unlikely to be 
resolved by the Von Dardel decision. Although that decision proposes three 
avenues of relief for ATCA plaintiffs who might be barred from bringing suit 
by the FSIA, all are flawed in several significant respects. Specifically, the leg-
islative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as well as case law 
construing that statute, do not support the holding in Von Dardel. In addition, 
the holding in that case conflicts with the customary international law governing 
sovereign immunity. Finally, significant policy reasons counsel against adopting 
the holding in Von Dardel. 
Bruce Telles 
293 This is especially so since most defendants will undoubtedly choose not to appear, happily 
accepting a default judgment, after which they may freely maintain their innocence of any wrongdoing. 
See, e.g., Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) (default judgment entered after Soviet Union 
declines to appear at trial; no appeal docketed as of March I, 1986); Siderman, No. CV 82-1772 RMT 
(MCx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (default judgment entered after Argentina refuses to appear 
at trial; judgment subsequently vacated for lack of jurisdiction). Such defendants would, of course, 
insist that their decision not to appear was motivated entirely by principled adherence to traditional 
theories of sovereign immunity, and point out that the merits of the case were never resolved against 
them. 
294 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 249, at 345. 
295Id. 
